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SPACS AND THE JOBS ACT 
 
Usha Rodrigues † 
     
Public Inroads in Private Equity 
 The law has long confined the average investor to trading in public securities1 
while allowing wealthy—or “accredited”2—individual investors access to a panoply of 
private securities, including investment vehicles such as hedge funds and private equity 
funds. Nevertheless, pressure to let the general public into private equity has been 
growing. Two forces have contributed to this mounting pressure. First, public investors 
are eager to try their hand at investing in private enterprise. Second, private firms need 
capital. In the face of these forces, the sharp line that has long separated public and 
private firms has become increasingly blurred.3 
 Consider the story of the emerging growth company (EGC), or “Initial Public 
Offering (IPO) on-ramp,” provision of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS 
Act). In its first few months on the books, this provision had effects far different from 
what its drafters envisioned. The JOBS Act’s IPO on-ramp was intended to ease regular 
                                                
† Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.  I thank Mike Stegemoller 
and the staff of the Harvard Business Law Review.  Any errors are my own. 
1 See, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d (West 2009 & Supp. 2012) amended by Jumpstart Our Business Startups 
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). 
2 Rule 501 of Regulation D describes several categories of accredited investors, including certain 
banks, charitable organizations, and certain high net worth individuals, who may invest in securities that 
are not registered. 17 C.F.R.  § 230.501(a) (2012). Most notably, individuals with a net annual income of 
over $200,000 or a total net worth of over one million dollars may invest in securities that are not 
registered provided that those securities meet the general disclosure requirements of Rule 502. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.502 (2012). 
3 For a few recent scholarly discussions of the public-private divide, see Donald C. Langevoort & 
Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act 
(Georgetown Law and Econ. Research Paper, No. 12-002, 2012) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1984686; Adam C. Pritchard, Revisiting “Truth in 
Securities” Revisited: Abolishing IPOs and Harnessing Private Markets in the Public Good (Univ. of 
Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 12-010, 2012) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2103246; Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty 
Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (on file with the author).  
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companies’ path to going public; instead, it has inadvertently made it easier for the 
average investor to get a taste of private equity via special purpose acquisition 
corporations (SPACs). This piece will briefly describe SPACs, the IPO on-ramp, and 
how shell companies have taken advantage of a legislative provision intended to bring 
cash-hungry young companies directly to market. This piece will close with a few 
thoughts on lessons the story of SPACs’ interaction with the JOBS Act may offer 
regarding the increasingly indistinct line that divides public and private investment. 
 
Introducing SPACs 
 A SPAC is a type of “blank-check” company that goes public to raise a pool of 
cash and then begins a hunt for a target.4 The bulk of the IPO proceeds are locked up in a 
trust account, invested in government-backed securities, and kept safe from the 
interference of the managers.5 Once a target is identified, the SPAC managers disclose 
material financial information about it to shareholders, who then have a say on whether 
the acquisition occurs by way of voting or opt-out rights.6 If no suitable target is found, or 
if a shareholder is unhappy with the deal, she can receive most of her money back—an 
average of ninety-eight cents on the dollar—from the trust account.7 But if a SPAC 
shareholder does like the deal, then she will end up having owned a piece of an 
acquisition vehicle—in essence, a one-off private equity fund.8 
  The beauty of the SPAC model is that it bifurcates the process of going public, 
making it faster and cheaper. When the SPAC itself goes public, it is basically an empty 
shell, so any disclosures required under the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) are 
minimal and cheap.9 The SPAC’s Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) 
filings are likewise minimal; in essence, they involve nothing more than reporting the rate 
of return generated in the trust account.10 If and when the SPAC acquires a target—
                                                
4 Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation: The Evolution of SPACs, 37 
DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2012). 
5 Id. 
6 Id.  
7 Id. 
8 See Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 172, 225 (2008) 
(“SPACs are a species of private equity: these are capital pools organized to acquire individual 
businesses. But because of the general requirement that the initial acquisition comprise eighty percent of 
its assets, SPACs typically only acquire a single privately-held business. Despite these important 
distinctions, SPACs otherwise attempt to mimic private equity returns by employing comparable 
structures and practices. For example, SPACs utilize similar leverage to increase the size and potential 
returns of their acquisitions. The managers of SPACs are also typically provided twenty percent of the 
initial share offering at nominal amounts; ownership they are required to maintain until and after 
consummation of an acquisition.”).  
9 Daniel S. Riemer, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies: Spac and Span, or Blank Check 
Redux?, 85 WASH. U.L. REV. 931, 950–51 (2007) (describing typical SPAC registration disclosure).  
10 Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 4.   
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usually a private company—that target immediately becomes public without the hassle, 
disclosures, and delay that accompany a typical IPO.11  
 
JOBS Act and SPACs 
 SPACs offered a rare chance for the average investor to participate in the rarified 
world of investing in private targets, while simultaneously offering those targets an easy 
route to an IPO. The JOBS Act took a decidedly different approach to blurring the line 
between public and private investment. Rather than letting the general public into private 
equity investments, the drafters tried the converse: encouraging more private firms to go 
public. Yet despite the JOBS Act’s focus on making it easier to bring traditional 
operating companies to the public market, its provisions have proven unexpectedly 
appealing for SPACs. Thus, legislation intended to help conventional companies go 
public is also facilitating a form of private equity investment. 
 SPACs’ business structure was in place long before the passage of the JOBS Act; 
indeed, they predated the Act by more than a decade.12 The whole point of the JOBS 
Act’s EGC provision was to coax small-cap companies into going public by reducing the 
burdens of public disclosure and ongoing federal regulation, thereby providing the benefit 
of access to the public capital markets previously unavailable to them. I thought surely 
the passage of the JOBS Act was bad news for SPACs. Why agree to be acquired by a 
SPAC when you can easily go public on your own? The JOBS Act, however, had an 
unanticipated effect on the SPAC market because the JOBS Act’s IPO on-ramp provision 
makes it easier and cheaper for any small corporation to go public.13   
 As it turned out, the JOBS Act was not all bad news for SPACs because many 
SPACs themselves decided to go public using the IPO on-ramp. Indeed, in the eight 
weeks after the JOBS Act’s passage, over a dozen of the companies taking advantage of 
the new on-ramp option were SPACs.14 Four months after the JOBS Act’s passage, one 
out of every nine EGCs was a SPAC.15 The trend has not abated; in the first half of 
August 2012, one out of five firms that made use of the IPO on-ramp provision were 
SPACs.16 To say the least, SPACs are making good use of the EGC option. 
                                                
11 Some call SPACs back-door IPOs, but SPACs differ from the seedier reverse mergers that led 
to so many Chinese companies with questionable accounting practices going public. Id.  
12 Riemer, supra note 9, at 944–45. 
13 For example, emerging growth companies need to disclose only two years of audited financial 
information prior to going public. 15 U.S.C.A. 77g(a)(2)(A) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012) amended by 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). They are not subject to 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s dreaded internal controls provision. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262(b) (West 2009& Supp. 2012) 
amended by Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).   
14 Emily Chasan, Meet the JOBS Act’s Jobs-Free Companies, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2012, at B1. 
15 Chris Hitt, “I Am Shocked, Shocked”: Blank Check Companies and the “Scandal” of the JOBS 
Act, BLOGMOSAIC (Aug. 16, 2012), http://blogmosaic.knowledgemosaic.com/2012/08/16/spacs-as-egcs/. 
16 Id. 
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 At first blush, SPACs’ use of the JOBS Act’s on-ramp seems counter-intuitive. It 
already was, and still is, easy for SPACs to go public under the conventional 1933 Act 
registration process. After all, SPACs’ disclosures at the start-up phase are largely 
boilerplate, along the lines of “this is who we are, this is how much money we plan to 
raise, this is how much we are setting aside in trust.”17 If it is so easy for SPACs to 
register under the 1933 Act, why should they bother with the on-ramp provision offered 
by the JOBS Act?  
 The answer to this question stems from economic realities. As it turns out, 
successful SPACs—that is, SPACs that complete acquisitions—can save a lot of money 
in securities regulation compliance costs by making use of the IPO on-ramp. The payoff 
comes from greatly reduced ongoing reporting requirements imposed by the Exchange 
Act. In particular, EGC status under the JOBS Act lasts up to five years, as long as 
revenues, market capitalization, and debt issuances stay low,18 and with that status come 
“scaled-back disclosures, certain exemptions to executive-compensation disclosures and 
attestation requirements for the auditors.”19 These features make EGC SPACs 
comparatively more attractive to potential targets. A private company looking to go 
public on the cheap (i.e., at even less expense than the JOBS Act’s on-ramp promises) 
might well favor an EGC SPAC acquirer that promises lower disclosure burdens over a 
traditional public company acquirer—or, for that matter, a non-EGC SPAC—both of 
which would require the Exchange Act’s more in-depth disclosure. Time will tell whether 
EGC SPACs prove to be more successful acquirers than traditional acquirers and non-
EGC SPACs. 
 In sum, despite reformers’ best intentions, many of the first companies to file as 
EGCs were not small operating companies rushing to access the capital markets as soon 
as regulatory barriers fell away. Instead, they were firms looking to acquire private firms 
down the road and take them public. Even so, the net effect may be what the JOBS Act’s 
drafters intended: if these new EGC SPACs have their way, they will acquire private 
firms, and thus bring more small firms to the public markets. Yet the SPAC EGCs will 
accomplish this goal in a roundabout way. More small firms will go public, as the JOBS 
Act envisioned, but by way of shell companies that allow the general public to participate 
in the uniquely public form of private equity that SPACs offer. While successful EGC 
SPACs will thus bring more firms public, they will at the same time allow their own 
investors to participate in a species of private equity investment, a kind of investment 
traditionally reserved for accredited investors. All of this supports a telling conclusion: 
both regulators and the market itself are exerting pressure on the line separating public 
and private investment, and these two separate forces can combine to produce 
unanticipated results. 
                                                
17 See, e.g., Acquicor Tech. Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Sept. 2, 2005). 
18 15 U.S.C.A. 77b(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012) amended by Jumpstart Our Business Startups 
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). 
19 Chasan, supra note 14. 
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Blurring the Line Between Public and Private 
 In conclusion, SPACs and the JOBS Act, both considered singly and taken 
together, signal the mounting pressure building over the divide between public and 
private investment. SPACs are mechanisms that let the public make private equity-like 
investments. The IPO on-ramp is an attempt to entice private companies to the public 
markets. Yet even more tellingly, these separate phenomena have recently interacted in 
an unexpected way, revealing how difficult it can be for reformers to revise the public-
private boundary with any degree of certainty. 
 SPACs and the JOBS Act’s IPO on-ramp are but two examples of recent trends 
that suggest that the line separating the public and private investment spheres may be 
blurring. Another example, the CROWDFUND Act, applies pressure on the other side of 
the public-private line: rather than making it easier for more private companies to access 
the public markets, it allows unaccredited investors a chance to invest limited sums in 
private companies for the first time.20 
 Securities regulation ultimately involves a delicate balancing act, with investors’ 
need for protection and firms’ thirst for capital pulling in opposite directions. The 
traditional balance reserved robust investor protection for the public markets, and allowed 
wealthy investors exclusive access to more risky, and potentially more profitable, private 
firm investment.21 But SPACs are a sign that the general public also desires to furnish 
capital to private firms in exchange for the chance to earn a higher rate of return.  At the 
same time, the JOBS Act signals a desire on the part of regulators and firms alike to 
allow companies to enjoy the benefits of being public while reducing some of the burdens 
that have traditionally accompanied public status.  Such examples thus, in different ways, 
indicate that the public-private boundary may be shifting dramatically. 
                                                
20 Title III of the JOBS Act, the CROWDFUND Act, allows issuers to sell up to one million 
dollars of securities in a twelve-month period without Securities Act of 1933 registration. Any investor 
can invest in these companies—they are not reserved for accredited investors only. If an investor’s annual 
net worth or income is less than $100,000, she can invest no more than 5% of her net worth or annual 
income or $2,000, whichever is greater. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L No. 112-106, sec. 
302, § 4(a)(6)(B)(i), 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012). If an investor’s annual net worth or annual income is 
equal to or more than $100,000, then she can invest no more than the greater of 10% of her net worth or 
annual income and $100,000. Id.  
21 Individuals qualify as accredited investors by having a net annual income of over $200,000 or a 
total net worth of over one million dollars. 17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (2012).  SEC regulations and industry 
practice dictates that only this special class of individual investors can invest in hedge funds, private 
equity funds, and venture capital funds. Thus, historically at least, ordinary investors have been shut out 
of the private market, except via pension funds that in effect pool the resources of many investors into an 
accredited-investor fund. No private market mutual funds currently exist. 
